Model-free, Model-based, and General Intelligence by Geffner, Hector
Model-free, Model-based, and General Intelligence
Hector Geffner1,2
1 Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Roc Boronat 138, 08032 Barcelona, Spain
2 ICREA, Pg. Lluı´s Companys 23, 08010 Barcelona, Spain
hector.geffner@upf.edu
Abstract
During the 60s and 70s, AI researchers explored in-
tuitions about intelligence by writing programs that
displayed intelligent behavior. Many good ideas
came out from this work but programs written by
hand were not robust or general. After the 80s, re-
search increasingly shifted to the development of
learners capable of inferring behavior and func-
tions from experience and data, and solvers capa-
ble of tackling well-defined but intractable models
like SAT, classical planning, Bayesian networks,
and POMDPs. The learning approach has achieved
considerable success but results in black boxes that
do not have the flexibility, transparency, and gen-
erality of their model-based counterparts. Model-
based approaches, on the other hand, require mod-
els and scalable algorithms. Model-free learners
and model-based solvers have close parallels with
Systems 1 and 2 in current theories of the human
mind: the first, a fast, opaque, and inflexible in-
tuitive mind; the second, a slow, transparent, and
flexible analytical mind. In this paper, I review
developments in AI and draw on these theories to
discuss the gap between model-free learners and
model-based solvers, a gap that needs to be bridged
in order to have intelligent systems that are robust
and general.
1 Introduction
The current excitement about AI is the result of a number
of breakthroughs in machine learning. Some of these de-
velopments are true AI milestones, like the programs that
achieve top world performance in games such as Chess and
Go by learning from self-play only [Silver et al., 2017a;
Silver et al., 2017b]. These are no small accomplishments
and most of them have to do with deep learning [LeCun
et al., 2015] and deep reinforcement learning [Mnih et al.,
2015]. The goal of this paper is to place these developments
in perspective, in particular by comparing model-free learn-
ers with model-based solvers. Solvers are programs that ac-
cept instances of different types of models, like SAT, clas-
sical planning, Bayesian networks, and POMDPs, and au-
tomatically compute their solutions. Learners and solvers
have interesting similarities and differences. Both are con-
cerned with the derivation of functions f for mapping in-
puts x into outputs, but while learners derive the function
f from data or experience, solvers compute the output f(x)
for each given input x from a model. Interestingly the scope
and characteristics of model-free learners and model-based
solvers have close parallels with those of the two systems or
processes that are currently assumed to make up the human
mind [Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013]: one,
a fast, opaque, and inflexible intuitive mind (System 1); the
other, a slow, transparent, and general analytical mind (Sys-
tem 2). A number of works have analyzed the limitations
of deep learning, often placing the emphasis on the need to
construct and use models [Lake et al., 2017; Darwiche, 2017;
Pearl, 2018; Marcus, 2018b]. In this paper, I place the em-
phasis on solvers, and in particular planners, which require
both models and general, scalable algorithms. The Systems 1
and 2 perspective will be useful for understanding the scope
of learners and solvers, and the need for a tight integration.
The paper is organized as follows. I trace some history,
look at learners, solvers, and planners, which are a particular
type of solvers, and address the similarities and differences
between learners and solvers, and the challenge of integrating
them.
2 Programming, AI, and AI Programming
Artificial Intelligence is a brain child of Alan Turing and his
universal computer [Turing, 1936]. Turing was not only a
logician and the father of the modern computer but also the
first modern programmer. Programming played a key role in
the early days of AI and in the selection of papers for the
seminal Computers and Thought book where each chapter
described “a working computer program” [Feigenbaum and
Feldman, 1963]. The emphasis on working programs, how-
ever, was not shared by everyone. John McCarthy, who was
both the father of the most popular AI programming language
at the time (Lisp) and the person that gave AI its name, was
putting the basis for the logical approach to AI where the em-
phasis was not in the use of representations but in their ex-
pressiveness and semantics [McCarthy, 1958]. Yet such dis-
senting views were not common and are not to be found in
the CT book. Several of the key AI contributions in 60s,
70s, and 80s had to do indeed with programming and the
representation of knowledge in programs, and this includes
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Lisp and functional programming, Prolog and logic pro-
gramming, rule-based programming, expert systems shells,
frames, scripts, and semantic networks [Charniak et al., 1980;
Norvig, 1992].
3 The Problem of Generality
Many great ideas came out of this work but there was a prob-
lem: the programs were not sufficiently robust or general,
and they tended to fail on examples or scenarios not antic-
ipated by the programmer. It was natural to put the blame
on the knowledge that the programs were missing but it was
not clear then how to proceed. Some programmers narrowed
down the domain and scope of the programs so that all the
relevant knowledge could be made explicit. This was the ’ex-
pert systems’ approach. Some took the programs as illustra-
tions or demonstrations of potential capabilities which were
not actually delivered. Some decided to sit down and write
down all the relevant commonsense knowledge. This was the
motivation underlying projects like CYC [Lenat et al., 1990].
McCarthy discussed related issues in his 1971 ACM Turing
lecture entitled “Generality in Artificial Intelligence”, pub-
lished in revised form many years later [McCarthy, 1987].
The limitations of AI programs for exhibiting general in-
telligence not tied to toy worlds or narrow domains led to an
impasse in the 80s, one of whose effects was a methodolog-
ical shift in which research increasingly moved away from
writing programs for ill-defined problems to designing algo-
rithms for well-defined mathematical tasks. The algorithms
are general in the sense that they are not tied to particular ex-
amples but to certain classes of models and tasks expressed in
mathematical form. The new programs, learners and solvers,
have a crisp functionality and both can be seen as computing
functions that map inputs into outputs (Figure 1).
4 Learners
The current excitement about AI in academia and in indus-
try is the result of a number of breakthroughs that have
pushed the state-of-the-art in tasks such as image understand-
ing, speech recognition, and challenging games [Krizhevsky
et al., 2012; Graves et al., 2013; Mnih et al., 2015], in cer-
tain cases delivering superhuman performance while starting
with basic knowledge of the rules of the game only [Silver et
al., 2017b]. These developments have to do with two classes
of learners: deep learners and deep reinforcement learners.
While these are not the only approaches pursued in machine
learning, they are the ones behind these milestones and the
ones on which I focus.
In both deep learning (DL) and deep reinforcement learn-
ing (DRL), training results in a function fθ that has a fixed
structure, given by a deep neural network [LeCun et al.,
2015], and a number of adjustable parameters θ. In DL, the
input vector x may represent an image and the output fθ(x),
a classification label, a probability distribution over the pos-
sible labels, or object labels with suitable bounding boxes. In
DRL, the input xmay represent the state of a dynamic system
or game, and the output fθ(x), the value of the state, the ac-
tion to be done in the state, or a probability distribution over
such actions. The key difference between DL and DRL is in
Input x =⇒ FUNCTION f =⇒ Output f(x)
Figure 1: Learners and solvers map inputs into outputs. Learners
derive the function f from data or experience. Solvers derive the
value of the function f(x) for each given input x from a model.
the way in which the functions fθ are learned during training.
Deep learning is a supervised method where the parameters θ
are learned by minimizing an error function that depends on
the inputs and target outputs in a training set. Deep reinforce-
ment learning, on the other hand, is a non-supervised method
that learns from experience, where the error function depends
on the value of states and their successors. In both DL and
DRL, the most common algorithm for minimizing the error
function is stochastic gradient descent where the parameter
vector θ is modified incrementally by taking steps in the di-
rection of the gradient. Similar optimization algorithms are
used in policy-based DRL where the function fθ represents a
policy.
The basic ideas underlying DL and DRL methods are not
new and can be traced back to the neural network and re-
inforcement learning algorithms of the 80s and 90s [Rumel-
hart and McClelland, 1986; LeCun et al., 1989; Sutton and
Barto, 1998]. The recent successes have to do with the gains
in computational power and the ability to use deeper nets on
more data. The use of these methods on problems that have
attracted and spurred commercial interest has helped as well.
A common question that arises is what are the limits of these
methods. One important restriction is that the inputs x and
outputs y of neural nets have a bounded, fixed size. This lim-
itation is not relevant for learning to play chess or Go whose
boards have a fixed size, but is relevant for tackling, for ex-
ample, arbitrary instances of the much simpler Blocks world.
Attention mechanisms have been proposed as a way to deal
with arbitrarily large inputs [Graves et al., 2014], but such
mechanisms introduce partial observability, which is another
challenge in learning. Indeed, as one moves away from the
basic setting of DL and DRL, the methods, the results, and
the evaluation standards, all look somehow weaker.
5 Solvers
The second type of programs that we consider are solvers.
Solvers take a convenient description of a particular model
instance (a classical planning problem, a constraint satisfac-
tion problem, and so on) and automatically compute its so-
lution. Solvers can also be thought as computing a function
f mapping inputs x into outputs, the difference is that they
work out of the box without training by computing the out-
put f(x) lazily for each given input x. The target f(x) is
given implicitly by the model. For a SAT solver, the inputs x
are formulas in conjunctive normal form, and the output f(x)
tells whether the formula x is satisfiable or not. For a classical
planner, the inputs are classical planning problems x and the
output is a plan that solves the problem. Solvers have been
developed for a variety of models that include constraint sat-
isfaction problems (CSPs), SAT, Bayesian networks, classical
planning, fully and partially observable non-deterministic and
stochastic planning problems (FONDPs, PONDPs, MDPs,
and POMDPs), general game playing, and answer set pro-
gramming among others [Dechter, 2003; Biere et al., 2009;
Pearl, 1988; Geffner and Bonet, 2013; Bertsekas, 1995;
Kaelbling et al., 1998; Genesereth et al., 2005; Gebser et al.,
2012]. Solvers are general as they must deal with any prob-
lem that fits the model: any classical planning problem, any
CSP, etc. This presents a crisp computational challenge, as
all models are computationally intractable, with complete al-
gorithms running in time that is exponential in the number of
problem variables or worse. The challenge is to push this ex-
ponential explosion as far as possible, as solvers should not
break down on a problem merely because it has many vari-
ables. To achieve this, domain-independent solvers must be
able to exploit the structure of the given problems so that their
performance over a given domain can approach the perfor-
mance of a domain-specific solver. The computational value
of solving techniques is assessed experimentally and in most
cases by means of competitions. Competitions have helped to
generate hundreds of problems used as benchmarks, have set
standards for the encodings of problems, and have facilitated
the empirical evaluation of algorithms. The focus on models
and solvers that can scale up has acted as a powerful filter on
ideas and techniques, setting up a clear distinction between
the ideas that look well from those that actually work well.
We illustrate some of these ideas in the context of planning
to make the comparison between learners and solvers more
concrete.
6 Planners
Planners are solvers for models that involve goal-directed be-
havior. Planners and planning models come in many forms
depending on a number of dimensions including: 1) uncer-
tainty about the initial situation and action transitions, 2) type
of sensing, 3) representation of uncertainty, and 4) objec-
tives. The simplest type of planning, classical planning, in-
volves no uncertainty about the initial situation or action ef-
fects, hence no uncertainty or sensing, and the objective is
to reach some condition. MDPs have stochastic actions and
full state observability and the objectives are described in two
different ways: as goals to be reached with probability 1 by
applying actions with positive costs (goal MDPs), or as dis-
counted rewards to be collected (discounted reward MDPs).
Other types of objectives considered in planning are tempo-
rally extended goals, like “visit rooms 5 and 7 forever”, that
are conditions on possibly infinite state trajectories [Cama-
cho et al., 2017]. Three other relevant dimensions in planning
are whether 5) models are expressed in compact or flat form,
6) solutions are sought off-line or on-line, and in the latter
case, 7) which off-line solution form is sought. About the last
point, partially observable problems can be solved optimally
with policies that map belief states into actions but can also
be approached effectively with simpler solution forms such as
finite-state controllers. Many of these dimensions affect the
complexity of planning. Focusing on the decision problems,
classical planning is PSPACE-complete, while classical plan-
ning with a fixed horizon is NP-complete [Kautz and Selman,
1996]. Similarly, PONDPs expressed in compact form are
2-EXP complete [Rintanen, 2004], while computing mem-
oryless policies for PONDPs expressed in flat form is NP-
complete [Chatterjee et al., 2016].
We look next at three powerful computational ideas in
planning, relaxations, transformations, and width, drawing in
each case contrasts between planners and learners.
6.1 Relaxations
The derivation of heuristics in classical planning for guiding
the search for plans follows an old idea: if you do not know
how to solve a problem, solve a simpler problem and use its
solution as guidance for solving the original problem [Pearl,
1983]. In planning, the most useful simplification P ′ of a
planning problem P is the monotonic relaxation where the
effects of the actions on the variables are made monotonic
[McDermott, 1999; Bonet and Geffner, 2001]. For this, the
states s¯ of the relaxation P ′ are defined not as assignment of
values x to variables X but as collection of atoms X =x. In
the original problem P , if an action a makes an atom X=x′
true, it makes the atoms X=x′ for x 6=x′ false. In the mono-
tonic relaxation, on the other hand, the new atomX=x′ does
not make the other atoms false. A result of this is that the
monotonic relaxation P ′ becomes decomposable: a plan that
achieves two atoms X = x and Y = y jointly in P ′ can be
obtained by concatenating a plan for X = x and a plan for
Y = y. This idea can be used to compute plans for all atoms
and hence for the conjunction of atoms in the goal of P ′ in
low polynomial time. The heuristic h(s) can be set then to
the size of the plan in the relaxation obtained from the state
s¯ where the only true atoms are those which are true in s
[Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001].1 Planners compute the heuris-
tic value h(s) for any state s over any problem P follow-
ing variations of this procedure. This is why they are called
domain-independent planners. Learners can infer the heuris-
tic function h over all the states s of a single problem P in a
straightforward way, but they can’t infer an heuristic function
h that is valid for all problems. This is natural: learners can
deal with new problems only if they have acquired experience
on related problems.
6.2 Transformations
Planners tend to work well even in large classical instances
yet many problems do not have this form. Transformations
are used to leverage on classical planners.
Goal recognition. Goal recognition is a classification prob-
lem where the hidden goal of an agent has to be uncovered
from his observed behavior and a pool of possible goals. For
example, an agent is observed to move up twice from the mid-
dle of the grid in Figure 2, and we want to determine to which
of the marked targets he may be heading to. A goal recogni-
tion problem P (G, O) can be represented as a classical prob-
lem P but with the goal replaced by a pool G of possible goals
G and a sequence of observed actions O. In the example, the
reason that the observed agent is likely to be moving to one of
1 When variables are boolean and actions are represented in
STRIPS as precondition, add, and delete lists, the monotonic relax-
ation is known as the delete-relaxation, as the monotonic relaxation
is obtained by making all delete lists empty.
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Figure 2: Left. Goal recognition: where is the agent heading to?
Right. Partial observability: get the gold without knowing where the
gold, pits, and wumpus are, using the sensors (see text).
targets in the top row is that it is not reasonable (cost-efficient)
to reach the other targets by moving up. This can be formal-
ized in terms of two cost measures (plan lengths) for each
possible goal G: the cost of reaching G with a plan that com-
plies with the observations, denoted c+(G), and the cost of
reaching G with a plan that does not comply with the obser-
vations, denoted c−(G). Bayes’ rule says that the goal pos-
terior is P (G|O) = P (O|G)P (G)/P (O) where the priors
P (G) can be assumed to be given. The posterior P (G|O) is
then determined by the likelihoods P (O|G) that express how
well each of the possible goalsG predictsO. In [Ramı´rez and
Geffner, 2010], the likelihood P (O|G) is set to a monotonic
function f of the cost difference ∆(G) = c−(G) − c+(G)
that expresses that the costlier that it is to reach G with a plan
that complies with O in relation to one that does not, the less
likely that it is the observationO givenG. The costs are com-
puted by running a planner on problems obtained from the
goal recognition problem P (G, O). The posterior distribu-
tion P (G|O) for all goals G ∈ G is computed using Bayes’
rule by calling a classical planner 2|G| times. Once again,
even if goal recognition is a classification problem, it is not
possible to obtain a general, domain-independent account of
goal recognition using learners instead of planners.
Partial observability. Figure 2 shows an instance of the
Wumpus problem [Russell and Norvig, 2009] where an agent
has to get the gold while avoiding the monster and the pits.
The positions of the gold, the monster, and the pits, however,
are not known to the agent that can sense stench if at dis-
tance one from the wumpus, a breeze, if at distance one from
a pit, and a shiny object if in the same cell as the gold. The
problem can be modeled as a POMDP or as a contingent plan-
ning problem but few planners scale up when the size of the
grid is increased. Even if we focus on on-line planning meth-
ods, two challenges need to be addressed: tracking the beliefs
about the true hidden state, and selecting the actions that take
the agent to the goal or provide relevant information. The
two challenges have been addressed jointly through a “plan-
ning under optimism” scheme where the partially observable
problem P is relaxed into a classical problem K(P ) inside
a plan-execute-observe-and-replan loop [Bonet and Geffner,
2014]. The transformation K(P ) removes the uncertainty in
P in two steps. First, literals L that represent that L is true
are replaced by two literals KL and K¬L, the first meaning
L is known to be true, the second meaning that L is known to
be false. Second, sensing the truth value of a positive literal
L that is currently unknown is mapped into two actions: one
that predicts KL, and another that predicts K¬L. The plan-
execute-observe-and-replan loop then executes the prefix of
the plan obtained from K(P ) using a classical planner until
a discrepancy is found between what has been predicted and
what has been observed. In such a case, the observed literals
are added, a new plan is computed, and the loop continues
until the goal is reached. For problems with no dead ends
and belief width 1, the executions are guaranteed to reach the
goal in a bounded number of steps [Bonet and Geffner, 2014].
Problems like Wumpus over 15x15 grids are solved consis-
tently very fast. On the other hand, coverage over instances
of problems like Minesweeper is not 100%, which is natural
as belief tracking in Minesweeper is NP-hard [Kaye, 2000]
while incomplete and polynomial in the planner [Palacios and
Geffner, 2009]. Learning approaches face two challenges in
these types of problems: dealing with partial observability
over instances of the same domain, and more critically, trans-
ferring useful knowledge from instances of one domain to
instances of another.
Finite-state controllers and generalized planning. Finite-
state controllers represent an action selection mechanism
widely used in video-games and robotics. A finite-state con-
troller for a partially observable problem P with actions a
and observations o can be characterized by a set of tuples
(q, o, a, q′) with no pair of tuples sharing the first two com-
ponents q and o. Each such tuple prescribes the action a to be
done when the controller state is q and the observation is o,
switching then to the controller state q′ (which may be equal
to q or not). A controller solves P if starting in the distin-
guished controller state q0, all the executions that are compat-
ible with the controller reach a goal state. In the approach by
Bonet et al. [2009], the problem P is transformed into a clas-
sical planning problem P ′ whose actions are associated with
each one of the possible tuples (q, o, a, q′), and where extra
fluents pq and po track the controller states and observations.
The action t = (q, o, a, q′) behaves like the action a but con-
ditional on pq and po being true, and setting pq′ to true. Fig-
ure 3 shows a problem where a visual-marker or eye (circle
on the lower left) must be placed on top of a green block by
moving it one cell at a time. The location of the green block
is not known, and the observations are whether the cell cur-
rently marked contains a green block (G), a non-green block
(B), or neither (C), and whether this cell is at the level of
the table (T) or not (–). The finite-state controller shown on
the right has been computed by running a classical planner
over the transformed problem. The controller moves the eye
from left to right at the level of the table, and when it finds
a block that is not green, it moves the eye up the tower and
then down. Interestingly, this controller not only solves the
problem shown on the left, but any modification of the prob-
lem resulting from changes in the number or configuration
of blocks. This is an instance of what has been called one-
shot learning: the controller obtained by the classical plan-
ner for one instance solves all instances of the problem. The
task of computing solutions to families of planning problems,
for example, all instances of Blocks world featuring blocks
q0 q1
–C/Down
TB/Right
TC/Right
–B/Up
TB/Up –B/Down
Figure 3: Left: Problem where a visual-marker (mark on the lower
left cell) must be placed on top of a green block whose location is
not known, by moving the mark one cell at a time, and by observ-
ing what’s in the marked cell. Right: Two-state controller obtained
with a classical planner. The controller solves the problem and any
variation resulting from changes in the number or configuration of
blocks. Edge q → q′ labeled o/a represents tuple (q, o, a, q′).
A and B where the goal is A on B, is called generalized
planning [Srivastava et al., 2011; Hu and De Giacomo, 2011;
Bonet et al., 2017]. Generalized planning provides an inter-
esting bridge to work in DRL [Groshev et al., 2017] as a gen-
eralized plan is not just the output f(x) for a particular plan-
ning instance x (Figure 1), but the function f itself. This is
indeed a case where planners and learners aim at the same
type of plans, ones using models, the others, experience.
6.3 Width
The third and last idea that we consider in planning is related
to a very simple search algorithm called IW(k) that has some
remarkable properties [Lipovetzky and Geffner, 2012]. The
algorithm assumes that the states s assign values to a num-
ber of boolean features F that are given. In classical plan-
ning, the boolean features are the atoms of the problem but
the algorithm applies to other settings as well. For k = 1,
IW(1) is a standard breadth-first search with just one change:
if upon generation of a state s, there is no feature fi in F
such that fi is true in s and false in all the states generated
before s, the state s is pruned. In other words, the only states
that are not pruned are those that make some feature true for
the first time. Such states are said to have novelty 1. The
number of states expanded by IW(1) is thus linear in |F | and
not exponential in |F | as in breadth-first search. The algo-
rithm IW(k) is IW(1) but applied to the larger feature set F k
made up of the conjunctions of k features from F . A basic
property of IW(k) is that most classical planning benchmark
domains can be formally shown to have a bounded and small
width w no greater than 2 when goals are single atoms, mean-
ing that any such instances can be solved optimally (shortest
plans) by running IW(w) in low polynomial time. For exam-
ple, the goal on(x, y) for any two blocks x and y in Blocks
world can be shown to have width no greater than 2, no mat-
ter the number of blocks or initial configuration. This means
that IW(2) finds a shortest plan to achieve on(x, y) in poly-
nomial time in the number of atoms and blocks even though
the state space for the problem is exponential. The majority
of the benchmarks, however, do not feature a single atomic
goal but a conjunction of them, and a number of extensions
of IW(k) have been developed aimed at them, some of which
represent the current state of the art [Lipovetzky and Geffner,
2017]. Moreover, unlike all the classical planning algorithms
developed so far, including those that rely on heuristics ob-
tained from relaxations or reductions into SAT, some of these
extensions scale up equally well without taking into account
the structure of actions (preconditions and effects), meaning
that they can plan with simulators [France`s et al., 2017]. In
particular, IW(1) has been used effectively as an on-line plan-
ner in the Atari video games in two modes: with the mem-
ory states of the emulator [Lipovetzky et al., 2015] and with
the screen states [Bandres et al., 2018]. In the first case, the
features fi are associated with each of the 256 values of the
128 memory bytes; in the second case, the features are the
B-PROST pixel features [Liang et al., 2016] defined and mo-
tivated by the neural net architecture underlying DQN [Mnih
et al., 2015].
7 Learners and Solvers: Contrasts
The IW(1) planner and the DQN learner perform comparably
well in the Atari games while working in ways that illustrate
key differences between learners and solvers: DQN requires
lots of training data and time, and then plays very fast, reac-
tively; IW(1) plays out of the box with no training but needs
to think a bit before each move.2 This is a general character-
istic: learners require training, which is often slow, but then
are fast; solvers can deal with new problems with no training
but after some deliberation. Solvers are thus general, domain
independent as they are called, in a way that learners can’t
be: solvers can deal with new problems from scratch, pro-
vided a suitable representation of the problems; learners need
experience on related problems.
The differences between model-free learners and model-
based solvers are reminiscent of current accounts in psychol-
ogy that describe the human mind as made of two interacting
systems or processes: a System 1 associated with the “intu-
itive mind”, and a System 2 associated with the “analytical
mind” [Evans and Stanovich, 2013]. Kahneman [2011] refers
to the two processes as fast and slow thinking. Common char-
acteristics associated with these systems are:
System 1 System 2
fast slow
associative deliberative
unconscious conscious
effortless effortful
parallel serial
automatic controlled
heuristic systematic
specialized general
. . . . . .
It is hard not to see the parallels between the characteristics
associated with Systems 1 and 2 on the one hand, and those
of learners and solvers on the other. The processes underlying
Systems 1 and 2 in the human mind, however, are not inde-
pendent: System 2 is assumed to have evolved more recently
than System 1 and to be based on it. For activities like solv-
ing a Sudoku, writing a proof, or understanding a long text,
it is assumed that the analytical System 2 is in command, in-
tegrating the suggestions of System 1 that are triggered by
20.5 seconds per move in the rollout version of IW(1).
clues issued by System 2 or picked up from context. Our ac-
count of classical planning as heuristic search has this flavor:
the deliberate search for the goal is informed by an heuristic
which must be opaque to the “analytical mind”, as it is com-
puted from a relaxed model that has no resemblance to the
real world [Geffner, 2010]. More generally, there cannot be
a System 2 without a System 1, as reasoning is computation-
ally hard and for inference methods to be effective they have
to be “biased” to exploit the structure of common tasks. At
the same time, human cognition cannot be a System 1 process
only, as there are situations and new problems where accumu-
lated experience and built-in mechanisms are not adequate.
8 Learners and Solvers: Challenges
The learning algorithm AlphaZero at the heart of the systems
that learn to play chess and Go at world-class level by pure
self-play [Silver et al., 2017a; Silver et al., 2017b] is an ef-
fective integration of a learner and a solver. AlphaZero is a
modified, pointwise version of policy iteration, a basic plan-
ning algorithm for MDPs and adversarial games where a pol-
icy is evaluated and improved iteratively [Bertsekas, 2018].
In AlphaZero, a neural network is used to represent the value
and policy functions, and in each iteration both functions are
improved incrementally at one state (and at others by general-
ization) by carrying out a Monte Carlo tree search [Coulom,
2006; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006] from such state guided
by the current value and policy functions. Interestingly, Alp-
haZero is similar to an algorithm developed independently at
the same time, Expert Iteration (ExIt), that is explicitly cast as
an integration of System 1 and System 2 inference [Anthony
et al., 2017]. Both AlphaZero and ExIt can also be under-
stood as systems that learn by imitation but with a planner as
teacher, and with the ability to iteratively improve the teacher.
Two key questions are what are the inherent limitations of
these algorithms, and what else would be needed in order to
get a more general integration of System 1 and System 2 in-
ference in AI systems. As mentioned before, a key restric-
tion of learners relying on neural networks is that the size of
their inputs x is fixed. This implies that learners cannot em-
ulate solvers even over specific domains. That is, deep learn-
ers cannot emulate a classical planner or a domain-specific
Blocks world planner unless arbitrary instances can be ex-
pressed in finite size. Attention mechanisms have been pro-
posed for this but attention may be more relevant for execut-
ing policies than for computing them. Regarding the second
question, some key dimensions for a more general and syn-
ergistic integration of learners and solvers are:
Model learning. Solvers provide flexibility and general-
ity, but solvers need models. Explanation and accountability
also require models: we build explanations and make pre-
dictions using models [Darwiche, 2017; Lake et al., 2017;
Pearl, 2018]. Model-based reinforcement learning is model-
learning but the standard algorithms assume that the state
variables are given. Learning models from streams of actions
and partial observations remains challenging.
Learning the relevant variables. In deep learning, repre-
sentation learning is learning functions (features) of the in-
puts that are somehow reusable. Features that are particularly
reusable are the variables of a problem. For example, many
of the Atari games involve 2D objects that move, and things
that happen as a result of collisions. How to learn such vari-
ables from the screen? Should the moving objects emerge
from a general learning scheme, from prior knowledge, or
from a combination of both [Mugan and Kuipers, 2012;
Thomas et al., 2017; Marcus, 2018a]?
Learning finite-size abstract representations. The input
size restriction makes it challenging for DRL methods to
learn general policies for achieving a goal like on(A,B) over
all instances with blocks A and B. An alternative to the
use of attention mechanisms is to learn problem abstractions
of bounded size that depend on the goal. For example, for
achieving the goal on(x, y) the only features that matter are
the number of blocks above x and above y, along with some
booleans, and a convenient, fixed-size abstraction of this fam-
ily of problems can be obtained by projecting the actions over
such features [Bonet and Geffner, 2018]. The challenge is to
learn such features and projections automatically.
Most work in DRL has not been aimed at an integration of
learners and solvers but at expanding the range of problems
handled by DRL. Something similar can be said about work
in planners and solvers. Yet, the solutions to some of the bot-
tlenecks faced by each approach, that often have to do with
representational issues, may lie in the integration that is re-
quired to resemble the integration of Systems 1 and 2 in the
human mind. One area where research on solvers and learn-
ers meet, as mentioned above, is in the computation of gen-
eralized plans capable of solving many problems at the same
time. Other types of challenges are dealing with other agents,
virtual or human, in what constitutes the social dimension of
intelligence, and dealing with a physical and social world that
is not segmented into problems or tasks [Dietterich, 2018].
9 AI: Dreams and Nightmares
AI is not close to a general, human level-intelligence but this
does not mean that current and future AI capabilities can’t
be used for good or ill. The Asilomar AI Principles enumer-
ate ways in which harms can be avoided and benefits real-
ized3 but the principles are not easy to enforce. It would be
great to align the values of AI systems with human values,
but the same applies to technology in general, politics, and
economics. Clearly, there are other forces at play: forces like
a powerful market and a weak political system, both increas-
ingly aimed at our System 1. I have argued why flexible and
transparent AI systems need a System 2 that cannot be pro-
vided by learners alone. The same applies to our collective
lives where learning from mistakes, when it is possible at all,
can be very costly. For living together in modern societies,
we need a well-functioning System 2 informed by facts and
the common good.4 If we want good AI, we can’t look away
from culture and politics.
3https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles.
4[Stanovich, 2005; Heath, 2014].
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